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ABSTRACT
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) and its variants have re-
cently attracted intensive research interests due to their elegant
theoretical foundation and excellent empirical performance as gen-
erative models. These tools provide a promising direction in the
studies where data availability is limited. One common issue in
GANs is that the density of the learned generative distribution
could concentrate on the training data points, meaning that they
can easily remember training samples due to the high model com-
plexity of deep networks. This becomes a major concern when
GANs are applied to private or sensitive data such as patient med-
ical records, and the concentration of distribution may divulge
critical patient information. To address this issue, in this paper we
propose a differentially private GAN (DPGAN) model, in which we
achieve differential privacy in GANs by adding carefully designed
noise to gradients during the learning procedure. We provide rig-
orous proof for the privacy guarantee, as well as comprehensive
empirical evidence to support our analysis, where we demonstrate
that our method can generate high quality data points at a reason-
able privacy level.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computingmethodologies→Neural networks; •Computer
systems organization→Neural networks; • Security and pri-
vacy→ Privacy-preserving protocols;
KEYWORDS
Deep Learning; Differential Privacy; Generative model
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, more andmore data in different application domains
are becoming readily available for the rapid development of both
computer hardware and software technologies. Many data mining
methodologies have been developed for analyzing those big data
sets. One representative example is deep learning, which typically
needs a huge amount of training samples to achieve promising
performance. However, there exists domains where it is impossible
to get as much data as we want. Medicine and Health Informatics
are such fields. On individual patient level analysis, each patient is
treated as a sample in model training process. However, considering
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the complexity of many diseases, the number of all patients from
the whole world is still very small and far from enough. Moreover,
we can never get the medical data from all patients for privacy
and sensitivity reasons. Further, the expensive and time-consuming
data collection process also limits the amount of data. Thus, the
problem of building high-quality medical analytics models remains
very challenging at present.
Generative models [5, 21–23, 30] have provided us a promising
direction to alleviate the data scarcity issue. By sketching the data
distribution from a small set of training data, we are able to sample
from the distribution and generatemuchmore samples for our study.
By combining the complexity of deep neural networks and game
theory, the Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [16] and its
variants have demonstrated impressive performance in modeling
the underlying data distribution, generating high quality “fake"
samples that are hard to be differentiated from real ones [24, 31, 32].
Ideally, with the high quality generative distribution in hand, we can
protect the privacy of raw data by releasing only the distribution
instead of the raw data to the public or constrained individuals,
and can even sample datasets to fit our needs and conduct further
analysis.
However, the GANs can still implicitly disclose privacy infor-
mation of the training samples. The adversarial training procedure
and the high model complexity of deep neural networks, jointly en-
courage a distribution that is concentrated around training samples.
By repeated sampling from the distribution, there is a consider-
able chance of recovering the training samples [2]. For example,
Hitaj etal. [19] introduced an active inference attack model that
can reconstruct training samples from the generated ones. There-
fore, it is highly demanded to have generative models that not only
generates high quality samples but also protects the privacy of the
training data.
With the above considerations, in this paper we propose a Differ-
entially Private Generative Adversarial Network (DPGAN). DPGAN
provides proven privacy control for the training data from the sense
of differential privacy [12]. Specifically, our proposed framework
applies a combination of carefully designed noise and gradient clip-
ping, and uses the Wasserstein distance [2] as an approximation
of the distance between probability distributions, which is a more
reasonable metric than JS- divergence in GAN. There are also prior
works on studying differential privacy in deep learning models [1].
However, our DPGAN is different from [1] by clipping only on
weights. We also proves that the gradient can be bounded at same
time, which avoids unnecessary distortion of the gradient. This
not only keeps the loss function with Lipschitz property but also
provides a sufficient privacy guarantee. Unlike the privacy pre-
serving deep framework mentioned in [25], whose privacy loss is
proportional to the amount of data needed to be labeled in public
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data set, the privacy loss of our DPGAN is irrelevant to the amount
of generated data. This makes our methods applicable under a wide
variety of real world scenarios. We evaluate DPGAN under vari-
ous benchmark datasets and network structures (fully connected
networks and CNN), and demonstrate that DPGAN can generate
high-quality data points with sufficient protection for differential
privacy with reasonable privacy budget.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: first, we will
briefly overview the related literature in Section 2, and then intro-
duce the proposed DPGAN framework and theoretical properties
in Section 3. Our framework is evaluated in Section 4 by the end.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we provide a brief literature review of relevant
topics: generative adversarial network, differential privacy and
differentially private learning in neural networks.
Generative Adversarial Network. GAN and its variants are de-
veloped in recent years with important advances from the theo-
retical perspective. Instead of clipping the weights, Gulrajani et
al. [17] improve the training stability and performance of WGAN
by penalizing the norm of the critical gradients with respect to its
input. Gulrajani et al. [17] is aligned with our differential privacy
framework due to controlled value of gradient norms.
Zhao et al. [36] introduces energy-based GAN (EBGAN), which
views the discriminator as an energy function that attributes low
energies to the regions near the data manifold and higher energies
to other regions. Similar to the original GANs, a generator is seen
as being trained to produce contrastive samples with minimal en-
ergies, while the discriminator is trained to assign high energies
to these generated samples. The instantiation of EBGAN frame-
work use an auto-encoder architecture, with the energy being the
reconstruction error, in place of the usual discriminator. The be-
havior of EBGAN has shown to be more stable than regular GANs
during training. Berthelot et al. [4] also use an autoencoder as a dis-
criminator and developed an equilibrium enforcing method, paired
with a loss derived from the Wasserstein distance. It improves over
WGAN by balancing the power of the discriminator and the gen-
erator so as to control the trade- off between image diversity and
visual quality. Qi [28] proposes a loss-sensitive GAN with Lipschitz
assumptions on data distribution and loss function. It improves
WGAN by allowing the generator to focus on improving poor data
points that are far apart from real examples rather than wasting
efforts on those samples that have already been well generated,
and thus improving the overall quality of generated samples. Jones
et al. [3] used differentially private version of Auxiliary Classifier
GAN (AC-GAN) to simulate participants based on the population of
the SPRINT clinical trial. Choi et al. [8] proposed medGAN, which is
a generative adversarial framework that can successfully generate
EHR. However, the approach may have privacy concerns as we
discussed earlier.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy (DP) [9] and related al-
gorithms have been widely studied in the literatures. Examples
include Dwork et al. [11] for sensitivity-based algorithm, which is
among the most popular methods that protect privacy by adding
noise to mask the maximum change of data related functions. This
work laid the theoretical foundation of many DP studies. Chaudhuri
et al. [6, 7] proposed DP empirical risk minimization. The general
idea of our DP framework has the same spirits as the objective
perturbation, which is different from adding noise directly on the
output parameters. Another related framework that adds noise on
gradient is Song et al. [35], which studied DP variants of stochastic
gradient descent. In their empirical results, the practice of mod-
erate increasing in the batch size can significantly improve the
performance. Song et al. [34] followed their early work [35], and
studied as how to use stochastic gradient to learn from models
trained by data from multiple sources with DP requirements (hence
multiple level of noise). A comprehensive and structured overview
of DP data publishing and analysis can be found in [37], where
several possible future directions and possible applications are also
mentioned.
Differentially Private Learning in Neural Network. The ap-
plications of DP in deep learning have been studied recently in sev-
eral literatures: Abadi et al. [1] studied a gradient clipping method
that imposed privacy during the training procedure. Shokri and
Shmatikov [33] for multi-party privacy preserving neural network
with a parallelized and asynchronous training procedure. Papernot
et al. [25] combined Laplacian mechanism with machine teaching
framework. Phan et al. [27] developed “adaptive Laplace Mecha-
nism” that could be applied in a variety of different deep neural
networks while the privacy budget consumption is independent of
the number of training step. Phan et al. [26] developed a private
convolutional deep belief network by leveraging the functional
mechanism to perturb the energy-based objective functions of tra-
ditional CDBNs.
We propose DPGAN to address the challenges appeared in the
previous works. In [25] the privacy loss is proportional to the
amount of data labeled in that public data set, which may bring
about unbearable privacy loss. We solve this problem by training
a differentially private generator and can generate infinite num-
ber of data points without violating the privacy of training data.
Shokri and Shmatikov [33] requires the transmission of updated
local parameters between server and local task, which is at risk of
leakage of private information. Our framework addressed this issue
by avoiding a distributed framework. Also, our work is different
from [26] by adding noise within the training procedure instead of
adding noise on both energy functions and an extra softmax layer.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we elaborate the proposed privacy preserving frame-
work DPGAN. Without loss of generality, we discuss the DPGAN
in the context of the WGAN framework [2] while we note that the
proposed DPGAN technique can also be easily extended to other
GAN frameworks. We firstly introduce differential privacy and then
conduct a brief review of GAN and WGAN. We then introduce mo-
ments accountant [1], which is the key technique in our framework
to set a bound to the probability ratio so as to guarantee the privacy
in the iterative gradient descent procedure.
3.1 Differential Privacy
The privacy model used in our approach is differential privacy [10].
Denote an algorithm with the differential privacy property byAp (·).
The algorithm is randomized in order to make it difficult for an
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observer to re-identify the input data, where an observer is anyone
who gets outputs of algorithms using the data. Differential privacy
(DP) is defined by [12]:
Definition 3.1. (Differential Privacy, DP) A randomized algorithm
Ap is (ϵ,δ )-differentially private if for any two databases D and
D ′ differing in a single point and for any subset of outputs S:
P(Ap (D) ∈ S) ≤ eϵ · P(Ap (D ′) ∈ S) + δ , (1)
where Ap (D) and Ap (D ′) are the outputs of the algorithm for
input databases D and D ′, respectively, and P is the randomness
of the noise in the algorithm.
It can be shown that the definition is equivalent to:log ( P(Ap (D) = s)P(Ap (D ′) = s)
) ≤ ϵ,
with probability 1−δ for every point s in the output range, where ϵ
reflects the privacy level. A small ϵ (≤ 1.0) means that the difference
of algorithm’s output probabilities using D and D ′ at s is small,
which indicates high perturbations of ground truth outputs and
hence high privacy, and vice versa. The non-private case is given by
ϵ = ∞. δ measures the violation of the “pure” differential privacy.
That is, there exists a small output range associated with probability
δ such that for some fixed point s in this area, no matter what the
value of ϵ is, one can always find a pair of datasets D and D ′ so
that the inequality | log( P (Ap (D)=s)P (Ap (D′)=s) )| ≥ ϵ holds. Typically we are
interested in values of δ so that are less than the inverse of any
polynomial in the size of the database.
According to Def. 3.1 and the intuition above, the noise protects
the membership of a data point in the dataset. For example, when
conducting a clinical experiment, sometimes a person does not want
the observer to know that he or she is involved in the experiment.
This is due to the fact that observer may link the test result to the
appearance/disappearance of certain person and harm the interest
of that person. A proper membership protection would ensure that
replacing this person with another one will not affect the result too
much. This property holds only if the algorithm itself is randomized,
i.e. the output is associated with a distribution. And this distribution
will not change too much if certain data point is perturbed or even
removed. This exactly what the differential privacy tries to achieve.
3.2 GAN and WGAN
Generative adversarial nets [16] simultaneously train two models:
a generative model G that transforms input distribution to output
distribution that approximates the data distribution, and a discrimi-
native model D that estimates the probability that a sample came
from the training data rather than the output of G. Let pz(z) be the
input noise distribution of G and pdata (x) be the real data distri-
bution, GAN aims at training G and D to play the following two-
player minimax game with value function V (G,D):
min
G
max
D
V (G,D) = Ex∼pdata (x)[loд(D(x))] (2)
+ Ez∼pz(z)[loд(1 − D(G(z)))].
WGAN [2] improves GAN by using theWasserstein distance instead
of the Jensen—Shannon divergence. It solves a different two-player
minimax game given by:
min
G
max
w ∈W Ex∼pdata (x)[fw (x)] − Ez∼pz(z)[fw (G(z))], (3)
where functions { fw (x)}w ∈W are all K-Lipschitz (with respect to
x ) for some K . Our approach exploits such K-Lipschitz property in
WGAN and solves Formula 3 in a differentially private manner.
3.3 DPGAN framework
Our method focuses on preserving the privacy during the training
procedure instead of adding noise on the final parameters directly,
which usually suffers from low utility. We add noise on the gradient
of the Wasserstein distance with respect to the training data. The
parameters of discriminator can be shown to guarantee differential
privacy with respect to the sample training points. We note that the
privacy of data points that havenâĂŹt been sampled for training is
guaranteed naturally. This is because replacing these data won’t
cause any change in output distribution, which is equivalent to
the case of ϵ = 0 in Definition 3.1. The parameters of generator
can also guarantee differential privacy with respect to the training
data. This is becuase there is a post-processing property of differ-
ential privacy [12], which says that any mapping (operation) after
a differentially private output will not invade the privacy. Here the
mapping is in fact the computation of parameters of generator and
the output is the differentially private parameter of discriminator.
Since the parameters of generator guarantee differential privacy of
data, it is safe to generate data after training procedure. In short,
we have: differentially private discriminator + computation of gen-
erator→ differentially private generator. This also means that even
if the observer gets generator itself, there is no way for him/her to
invade the privacy of training data.
The DPGAN procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1. In line 9,
the clipping guarantees that { fw (x)}w ∈W are allKw -Lipschitz with
respect to x for some unknown Kw and act in a way to bound the
gradient from each data point. The RMSProp in line 8 and line 13 is
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Generative Adversarial Nets
Require: αd , learning rate of discriminator. αд , learning rate of generator.
cp , parameter clip constant. m, batch size. M, total number of training
data points in each discriminator iteration. nd , number of discriminator
iterations per generator iteration. nд , generator iteration. σn , noise
scale. cд , bound on the gradient of Wasserstein distance with respect
to weights
Ensure: Differentially private generator θ .
1: Initialize discriminator parameters w0, generator parameters θ0.
2: for t1 = 1, . . . , nд do
3: for t2 = 1, . . . , nd do
4: Sample {z(i ) }mi=1 ∼ p(z) a batch of prior samples.
5: Sample {x(i ) }mi=1 ∼ pdata (x) a batch of real data points.
6: For each i , дw (x(i ), z(i )) ← ∇w
[
fw (x(i )) − fw (дθ (z(i )))
]
7: д¯w ← 1m (
∑m
i=1 дw (x(i ), z(i )) + N (0, σ 2nc2д I )).
8: w (t2+1) ← w (t2) + αd · RMSProp(w (t2), д¯w )
9: w (t2+1) ← clip(w (t2+1), −cp, cp )
10: end for
11: Sample {z(i ) }mi=1 ∼ p(z), another batch of prior samples.
12: дθ ← −∇θ 1m
∑m
i=1 fw (дθ (z(i )))
13: θ (t1+1) ← θ (t1) − αд · RMSProp(θ (t1), дθ )
14: end for
15: return θ .
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an optimization algorithm that can adaptively adjust the learning
rate according to the magnitude of gradients [18].
3.4 Privacy Guarantees of DPGAN
To show the DPGAN in Algorithm 1 indeed protects the differen-
tial privacy, we demonstrate that the parameters of generator θ
(through discriminator parametersw) guarantee differential privacy
with respect to the sample training points. Hence any generated
data fromG will not disclose the privacy of training points. Through
the moment accountant mechanism, we can compute the final com-
position result ϵ . By treating parameters of discriminatorw(t2+1)
(line 9 in Algorithm 1) as one point in the output space, it is easy
to see that the procedure of updatingw for fixed t2 in any loop is
just the algorithm Ap in definition 3.1. Here the input of Ap is
real data and noise and the output is the updated w . So we have
Ap (D) = M(aux ,D) where aux is an auxiliary input, which in our
algorithm refers to the previous parameters w(t2). Hence the up-
date ofw(t ) (line 3 to 10 in Algorithm 1) is an instance of adaptive
composition. Together with definition 3.1, it is natural to define the
following privacy loss at o:
Definition 3.2. (Privacy loss)
c(o;M,aux ,D,D ′) ≜ log P[M(aux ,D) = o]
P[M(aux ,D ′) = o] ,
which describes the difference between two distributions caused
by changing data. The privacy loss random variable is given by
C(M,aux ,D,D ′) = c(M(D);M,aux ,D,D ′), which is defined by
evaluating the privacy loss at an outcome sampled from M(D).
Note that we assume the supports of 2 distributions associated with
M(aux ,D) and M(aux ,D ′) are generally the same so it is safe to
evaluate them at same point o. This is a critical assumption since
if there is an area s in support M(aux ,D) but not in M(aux ,D ′),
then evaluating C(M,aux ,D,D ′) in s will result in∞ and violate
the privacy. We define the log of the moment generating function
of the privacy loss random variable and moments accountant as:
Definition 3.3. (Log moment generating function)
αM (λ;aux ,D,D ′) ≜ logEo∼M (aux,D)[exp(λC(M,aux ,D,D ′))].
Definition 3.4. (Moments accountant)
αM (λ) ≜ max
aux,D,D′
αM (λ;aux ,D,D ′).
Moments accountant can be seen as the “worst situation” of the
moment generating function. The definition ofmoments accountant
enjoys good properties as mentioned in [1] (Theorem 2), where the
composability property shows that the overall moments accountant
can be easily bounded by the sum of moments accountant in each
iteration, which brings about a result that privacy is proportional
to iterations. The tail bound can also be applied in the privacy
guarantee (Theorem 1 in same paper). We will use this theorem
to deduce our own result. Comparing with strong composition
theorem [14], moments accountant saves a factor of
√
log(nд/δ ).
According to the definition 3.1, for a large iteration nд , this is a
significant improvement.
In order to use moments accountant we need дw (x(i), z(i)) to be
bounded (by clipping the norm in Algorithm 1 in [1]) and add noise
according to this bound. We do not clip the norm of дw (x(i), z(i)) ,
instead we show that by only clipping onw can we automatically
guarantee a bound of the norm of дw (x(i), z(i)).
Lemma 3.5. Under the condition of Alg. 1, assume that the activa-
tion function of the discriminator has a bounded range and bounded
derivatives everywhere: σ (·) ≤ Bσ and σ ′(·) ≤ Bσ ′ , and every data
point x satisfies ∥x∥ ≤ Bx , then ∥дw (x(i), z(i))∥ ≤ cд for some con-
stant cд .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume fw is implemented
using a fully connected network. Let H be the number of layers
except input layer. LetW(l ) be the l-th weight matrix (l = 1, . . . ,H )
whose element W(l )i j is the weight connecting j-th node in layer
l − 1 to i-th node in layer l . Let D(l ) be the diagonal Jacobian of
nonlinearities of l-th layer. We thus have:
D(l )i j =
{
σ
′(w(l )i, :σ (z(l−1))) if i = j
0 if i , j
(4)
where w(l )i, : is the ith row ofW
(l ) and σ (z(l−1)) is the output of
the l − 1-th layer. The following fact is well known from the back-
propagation algorithm on a fully connected network:
δ (H ) = ∇aC ⊙ σ ′(z(H )), (5)
δ (l ) = ((W(l+1))Tδ (l+1)) ⊙ σ ′(z(l )), (6)
∂C
∂W(l )jk
= a(l−1)k δ
(l )
j , (7)
whereC is the cost function, z(l ), a(l ) and δ (l ) are the input, output
and error vector of layer l , respectively. From 7 we have for l =
2, . . . ,H :
∂C
∂W(l )
= δ (l )(a(l−1))T
= (D(l )(W(l+1))Tδ (l+1))(a(l−1))T
= (D(l )(W(l+1))T . . .D(H−1)(W(H ))Tδ (H ))
∗ (a(l−1))T
= (D(l )(W(l+1))T . . .D(H−1)(W(H ))T )
∗ (a(l−1))T σ ′(z(H )). (8)
Take ∂C
∂W(l0) as an example:[D(l )(W(l+1))T ]i j ≤ cpBσ ′
[D(l )(W(l+1))TD(l+1)(W(l+2))T ]i j ≤ (cpBσ ′ )2ml+1,
where we assume that cp ≤ 1ml+1Bσ ′ . Hereml+1 is the number of
nodes in the l + 1th layer. And thus we have:
H−1∏
l=l0
D(l )(W(l+1))T
 i j ≤ (cpBσ ′ )H−l0
H−2∏
l=l0
ml+1. (9)
Because of the assumption that σ (·) ≤ Bσ , we have a(l−1)j ≤ Bσ .
Combining it with 8, we have [ ∂C
∂W(l ) ]i j ≤ cpBσB2σ ′ and therefore
Differentially Private Generative Adversarial Network Conference’18, Aug 2018, London, UK
we have:
∥дw (x(i), z(i))∥ =
∇w ( fw (x(i)) − fw (дθ (z(i))))
≤ 2
∇w fw (x(i)) = 2∑l ∑i j [ ∂C∂W(l )
]
i j
≤ 2cpBσB2σ ′
∑H−1
k=1 mkmk+1 = cд ,
where the boundness of дθ (z(i)) comes from the choice of sigmoid
activation in the last layer of generator. Note that when computing
cд , we need to take into consideration the dropout rate, weight
sparsity, connection percentage of convolutional nets, and other
factors. □
Remark 1. Note that activation functions like ReLU (and its vari-
ants) and Softplus have unbounded Bσ . This will not affect our
result because both the data points and weights are bounded, which
guarantees that the output of each node in each layer is bounded. The
boundness of data comes from a common fact that each data element
has a bounded range.
We have the following lemma which guarantees DP for discrim-
inator training procedure.
Lemma 1. Given the sampling probability q = mM , the number of
discriminator iterations in each inner loop nd and privacy violation δ ,
for any positive ϵ , the parameters of discriminator guarantee (ϵ,δ )-
differential privacy with respect to all the data points used in that
outer loop (fix t1) if we choose:
σn = 2q
√
nd log(
1
δ
)
/
ϵ . (10)
Proof. The DP guarantee for the discriminator training pro-
cedure follows from the intermediate result [1] (Theorem 1). We
need to find an explicit relation between σn and ϵ , i.e., how much
noise standard deviation σn we need to impose on the gradient
so that we can guarantee a privacy level ϵ , with small violation δ .
Combine inequality ndq2λ2/σ 2 ≤ λϵ/2 and inequality e−λϵ/2 ≤ δ
in Theorem 1, we can get the result by letting the equality hold. □
Lemma 1 quantifies the relation between noise level σn and
privacy level ϵ . It shows that for fixed perturbation σn on gradient,
largerq leads to less privacy guarantee (largerq). This is indeed true
since when more data are involved in computing discriminatorw ,
less privacy is assigned on each of them. Also, more iterations (nd )
leads to less privacy because the observer gives more information
(specifically, more accurate gradient) for data. This requires us
to choose the parameters carefully in order to have a reasonable
privacy level. Finally we have the following theorem as the privacy
guarantee of the parameters of the generator:
Theorem 1. The output of generator learned in Algorithm 1 guar-
antees (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy.
The privacy guarantee a direct consequence from Lemma 1 fol-
lowed by the post-processing property of differential privacy [12].
4 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we will present extensive experiments to investigate
how the noise will affect the effectiveness of generative network on
two benchmark datasets (MNIST and MIMIC-III)1. There are sev-
eral notable findings that are worth highlighting. The Wasserstein
distance converges as the training procedure goes on and exhibits
fluctuation in the late stage in the case of privacy. This fluctuation
correlates well with the quality of generated data and reflects the
privacy level. In addition, our framework can be generalized un-
der various network structures and applied on many benchmark
datasets.
4.1 Relationship between Privacy Level and
Generation Performance
We conduct experiments on MNIST dataset to illustrate the rela-
tionship between the privacy level and the quality of output images
from the generator.
In this experiment, we set both the learning rate of discrimi-
nator αd and generator αд to be 5.0 × 10−5. The parameter clip
constant cp is 1.0× 10−2 such that the weights of discriminator will
be clipped back to
[−cp ,+cp ] . We use MNIST’s training data with
data size M = 6 × 104 and the batch sizem is set to be 64. Hence
the sample probability q is mM =
64
6×104 ≈ 1.1 × 10−3 . The noise
scale δ is 10−5, and the number of iterations on discriminator (nd )
and generator (nд ) are 5 and 5 × 105, respectively. Since we use
leaky ReLU as the activation function on discriminator network
and ReLU on generative network, we have Bσ ′ ≤ 1, where Bσ ′ is
the bound on the derivative of the activation function. Dimension
of z is 100 and every coordinate is within [−1, 1]. We adopt simi-
lar network structure of DCGAN [29] with noise generation and
inference parts to protect data privacy, of which the effectiveness
has been verified in [2]. To impose a certain level of noise on the
network, we choose Gaussian noise with zero mean (hence no bias)
and multiple values of standard deviation. Gaussian distribution is
widely used in privacy-preserving algorithm (see Gaussian mecha-
nism and its variants in [12]) and usually results in (ϵ,δ )-differential
privacy. We add L2-regularization on the weights of generator and
discriminator, which has little impact on our bound in Lemma 3.5.
In the first experiment we investigate how the change in noise
level affects the image quality. Four groups of the generated images
are plotted and shown in Figure 1, corresponding to 4 different ϵ
values. In each group, the leftmost column shows the generated
images for a certain ϵ value. The rest three columns are the cor-
responding nearest neighbor images from the training set, which
demonstrates that the distortions of images are caused by noise in-
stead of bad training images. The distance between training images
and generated images is Euclidean norm. Comparing the gener-
ated images with their nearest neighbors, it is clear to see that
our model is not simply to memorize the training data but to be
capable of generating photographic samples with unique details. As
mentioned in [16], these images indeed come from actual samples
of the model distributions, rather than the conditional means given
samples of hidden units. Most importantly, the generated images
of each group in Figure 1 shows that, the larger the variance of
1Code and experiment scripts are available at: https://github.com/illidanlab/dpgan
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Figure 1: Generated images with four different ϵ onMNIST dataset are plotted in leftmost column in each group. Three nearest
neighbors of generated images are plotted to illustrate the generated data is not memorizing the real data and the privacy is
preserved. We can see that the images get more blurred as more noise is added.
noise is, the blurrier the generated images would be, when all other
conditions are the same. In the sense of differential privacy, any
observer who gets the generated images can hardly know whether
a data point is involved in the training procedure or not, as elab-
orated in Theorem 1 and illustrated by the generated images in
Figure 1. The observer has no way to reconstruct the training im-
ages in such case and hence the privacy of data is protected. This
demonstrates that our model successfully addresses the privacy
issue mentioned previously. The noise level (ϵ) is recommended to
be tuned in a large range to guarantee good quality of generated
images. In addition, it can be seen from the results that our method
does not suffer from mode collapse or gradient vanishing, which is
an advantage that is inherited from the WGAN network structure.
4.2 Relationship between Privacy Level and the
Convergence of Network.
In the second experiment, we plot the Wasserstein distance for
every 100 generator iterations. The result shows that the Wasser-
stein distance decreases during training and converges in the end,
which also correlates well with the visual quality of the generated
samples [2]. The corresponding results are shown in Figure 2. As
expected, the Wasserstein distance decreases as the training proce-
dure goes on and converges, which is the result of joint effect of
discriminator and generator.
Despite the fluctuation caused by the min-max training itself, we
can also observe that, a smaller ϵ (hence larger noise) leads to more
frequent fluctuation and larger variance, which is especially clear in
the latter half of the curves. This conforms to the common intuition
that more noise will results in a more blurry image, which is also
consistent with the results of the previous experiment. One interest-
ing phenomena is that the peaks often appear after the convergence
of Wasserstein distance. More evidences show that this might be
caused by clipping the weight. The reason is that clipping weights
is equivalent to adjusting the gradient дi in directions whose the
corresponding gradientwi magnitude is too large (|wi | > cp ). Dif-
ferent from gradient descent step (even with noise) which always
changes the weight towards the optimal solution, the effect of such
adjustment is hard to predict and hence might cause instability.
This is especially clear when network converges. However, these
peaks can be quickly eliminated during the training procedure and
the network may maintain a numerical stability. This is due to the
fact that the generator is in convergence stage, which is one of the
advantages of adversarial networks. Hence our system does not suf-
fer from divergence problem. Again, this experiment demonstrates
the most important property of a learning system with differential
privacy consideration: there exists a trade-off between learning
performance and privacy level.
4.3 Classification on MNIST Data
In this section we conduct a binary classification task to further
evaluate the quality of the generated MNIST data. Here we use
the same settings as in subsection 1 4.1. Take a pair of digits 0 and
1 as an example, we generate 0s and 1s from their own training
samples (use all samples) separately, with different ϵ values. For
each digit, we generate equal number of data as training samples.
Then for fixed ϵ (and for training set), we randomly select 4000
samples from generated data (contains 2000 for both 0 an 1), build
classifiers on them and test on MNIST’s testing set. Then we repeat
this for 100 times and show the accuracy (Figure 3) on testing set
with classifiers built from training data and generated ones with
different standard deviations. Finally we run the same procedures
for digit pairs 23 and 45, as well.
The results are shown in Figure 3. Despite the fact that smaller
noise makes the accuracy higher (better generated quality), the vari-
ance of plot also decreases generally. The generate quality is little
affected below some threshold (for example, somewhere between
3.0 and 11.0 for digit 01). Thus it is recommended to choose an ϵ
larger than that threshold (add less noise) so that the generated
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Figure 2: Wasserstein distance for different privacy levels when applying DPGAN on MINST. We can see that the curves con-
verge and exhibit more fluctuations as more noise is added.
(a) Digit 0 and 1 (b) Digit 2 and 3 (c) Digit 4 and 5
Figure 3: Binary classification task onMNIST databasewith different training strategies. From left to right we use training data,
generated data without noise, generated data with ϵ = 11.5, 3.2, 0.96, 0.72. We can see that as less noise is added, the accuracy of
classifier build on generated data gets higher, which indicates that the generated data has better quality.
data will not be affected much. Note that a threshold between 3.0
and 11.0 is quite promising privacy level. Comparing among three
figures, digit pairs 01 performs better than the rest two, which is
due to the reason that the shapes of digit 0 and 1 make them easy to
be separated. This experiment use classification task to demonstrate
the trade-off between learning performance and privacy level.
4.4 Electronic Health Records
In this section we apply DPGAN to generate Electronic Health
Records (EHR) while the privacy of patients is needed to be pro-
tected. EHR is one of the most important information sources from
which we can learn the genetics and biological characteristics of
certain population. However, the access to EHR requires adminis-
trative permission in consideration of the privacy protection, which
is very inconvenient to the research community. Choi et al. pro-
posed medGAN [8], which can successfully generate EHR based on
MIMIC-III critical care datasets [15, 20], while the sensitive informa-
tion is not guaranteed to be protected. MIMIC-III is a well-known
public EHR database consisting of the medical records of 46,520
intensive care unit (ICU) patients over 11 years old. In our exper-
iments we use the extracted ICD9 codes2 only, and group them
using their first 3 digits. For each patient (1 out of 46520) in each
admission to one hospital, we record what kind of diseases this
patient has and make it into a hot vector. For example, patient A
has been diagnosed with 3 diseases (with ICD9 codes 9, 42 and 146,
respectively) in one admission and we use a vector to represent the
patient A’s visit, where the vector has digit 1 in position 9, 42 and
146, and has digit 0 in the rest positions. Then we add up all vectors
2International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 9th
edition
(different admissions and different hospitals) of a certain patient
and hence each patient has one and only one vector x ∈ Z |C |+ with
|C | = 1071. We then binarize the data, where all non-zero elements
are transferred to 1. These vectors serve as summary of historical
record of each patient’s health condition and can be considered as a
feature for patients. Together we can also extract useful information
from these vectors. Notice that we remove the patient data with
missing values before feeding them into network.
Similar to previous experiments, we set the learning rates of both
the discriminator αd and generator αд to be 5.0×10−4. The parame-
ter clip constant cp is 0.1 and nd is equal to 2. Also we havem = 500,
M = 46520 for MIMIC-III dataset and q = 50046520 ≈ 1.1 × 10−2. The
δ is set as 10−5. We adopt the same network structure as in [8].
After generating the data, we set a threshold at 0.5 to convert the
generated data matrix from continuous domain to binary domain.
Since the quality of EHR cannot be observed as images directly, we
adopt the dimensional wise probability (DWP) [8] as a quantitative
measurement for the quality of the generated data, which is to
check whether the model has learned each dimensionâĂŹs distri-
bution correctly. Through DWP we study how the performance of
DPGAN varies with the changing of noise level.
The results are shown in Figure 4 for different noise magnitudes.
Each point in the figure is a pair of float numbers that represents
Bernoulli success probability of real data (x-axis), and generated
data (y-axis) of one dimension (corresponding to one disease). The
Bernoulli success probability (of each dimension) is the sample
mean of that dimension (Maximum likelihood estimation of inde-
pendent of Bernoulli trials), which is a portion of 1 in that column.
This characterizes the rareness of that disease and hence together
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(a) ϵ=∞ (b) ϵ=2.31 × 102 (c) ϵ=1.39 × 102 (d) ϵ=96.5
Figure 4: DWP evaluation on MIMIC-III database with different ϵ values (1070 points). We can see that as more noise is added,
the distribution of generated data in each dimension becomes more deviated from the real training data.
(a) ϵ=∞ (b) ϵ=2.31 × 102 (c) ϵ=1.39 × 102 (d) ϵ=96.5
Figure 5: Dimension-wise prediction evaluation on MIMIC-III database with different ϵ values. We can see that as more noise
is added, AUC value of classifier build from generated data gets lower and the data gets sparser.
reflects the distribution of diseases among population, which is
a very important statistical characteristic and can be frequently
queried. Hence there is a must to protect the people who provide
this distribution by adding noise. Despite the theoretical result in 1,
we can understand the privacy protection in a intuitive way: on
one hand, if no noise added (Figure 4 (a)), changing database by
adding one person may change the frequency of certain disease in
some extent. This change is especially significant when the number
of people in database is small or a group of people is changed (See
"group privacy" in [13]). By looking at this change, an observer
may make some conclusions and harm the interest of anyone who
involves in the database. For example, adding a group of people may
enlarge the frequency of certain disease, if this disease is highly
related with the quality of life or it is some rare disease, health in-
surance company may raise people’s premiums. On the other hand,
if there is noise added (Figure 4 (b) to (d)), observer is not sure what
is the effect by adding this person (or these people) because the
output is uncertain (associated with a noise distribution) and the
generated data will hardly leak any patient’s privacy information.
This uncertainty gets larger when more noise is added, which can
be seen from Figure 4. On the whole, it can be seen from this ex-
periment that our model indeed provides protection in the sense of
differential privacy on the medical data, and solves the problem we
mentioned in abstract.
Note that the rareness of diseases are also well protected due to
the perturbation of noise. Assuming that there is a public-available
generated EHR data that are generated based on the EHR of a
certain population, the insurance company may raise the insurance
premium for those who get rare diseases, based on the statistical
information inferred from generated EHR data. Since DPGAN may
change the rareness of diseases, the issuarance company cannot
get this type of information accurately from our generated data,
thus the interest of this group of people is guaranteed.
The results also indicate how well the generative model captures
training data’s distribution. In Figure 4 (a), most of the points are
concentrated around line y = x , which indicates that our model
captures each dimension’s distribution correctly. It can also be seen
from Figure 4 (left to right) that a large variance of noisemakesmore
points deviated from line y = x . This means that for one disease,
the rareness of generated data becomes more different from real
data, which also indicates the quality of generated data is degraded.
This phenomenon matches our intuition that applying a higher
level of noise often leads to a worse distribution approximation,
which is also consistent with evidence in Figure 2 (a) in [8].
4.5 Classification on EHR Data
Continue with previous sub-section, we use dimension-wise pre-
diction (DWpre) [8] to evaluate how well the generative model
recovers the relationship among the dimensions of the data. The
basic idea of DWpre is to select the same column from training set
and generated set as target and set the rest columns as feature. Then
we build logistic regression classifiers on both of them and test on
testing set. One assumption here is that a closer performance of
two classifiers indicates better quality of the generated set. Due to
the highly unbalanced testing data (0 is dominated), we use AUC
as the measurement here.
The results are shown in Figure 5. Despite the fact that in most
cases, classifiers trained from real data perform better than clas-
sifiers trained from generated data, the AUC values of generated
data decrease as the decreasing of the ϵ (more noise added). This is
due to the reason that noise perturbs the training of discriminator
and affects the generator indirectly, which leads to the deviation of
output distribution from the real one and can results in poor testing
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performance. It can also be seen that there is not much decreasing
in the performance, which is one of the advantages of our model.
The points get sparser as more noise is added, which reflects an-
other impact of noise on data. This is due to the reason that we
use logistic regression to perform binary classification, which does
not allow uni-label column. The sparse column are widely exists
in original data and it is harder for the generative model to cap-
ture the sparsity of certain column of original data if there is more
perturbation. More columns are learned as all-zero and discarded
when selected as target in classification task. In summary, higher
privacy results in less ability for generative model to capture the
inter- dimensional relationship. Also our framework successfully
addresses the issue in differential privacy system that adding noise
will cause too much decreasing in system performance.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a privacy preserving generative adver-
sarial network (DPGAN) that preserves privacy of the training data
in a differentially private sense. Our algorithm is proved rigorously
to guarantee the (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy. We conducted two ex-
periments to show that our algorithm can generate data points with
good quality and converges under the condition of both noisy and
limitation of training data, with meaningful learning curves useful
for tunning hyperparameters. For future work we will consider
reducing the privacy budget by trying different ways of clipping,
and also tighten the utility bound.
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